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Abstract 
In  thinking  about  the  transformative  potential  of  network  technologies  with  respect  to  human 
cognition, it is common to see network resources as playing a largely assistive or augmentative role. 
In this paper we propose a somewhat more radical vision. We suggest that the informational and 
technological  elements  of  a  network  system  can,  at  times,  constitute  part  of  the  material 
supervenience base for a human agent’s mental states and processes. This thesis (called the thesis of 
network-enabled cognition) draws its inspiration from the notion of the extended mind that has 
been  propounded  in  the  philosophical  and  cognitive  science  literature.  Our  basic  claim  is  that 
network systems can do more than just augment cognition; they can also constitute part of the 
physical  machinery  that  makes  mind  and  cognition  mechanistically  possible.  In  evaluating  this 
hypothesis,  we  identify  a  number  of  issues  that  seem  to  undermine  the  extent  to  which 
contemporary network systems, most notably the World Wide Web, can legitimately feature as part 
of  an  environmentally-extended  cognitive  system.  Specific  problems  include  the  reliability  and 
resilience of network-enabled devices, the accessibility of online information content, and the extent 
to which network-derived information is treated in the same way as information retrieved from 
biological memory. We argue that these apparent shortfalls do not necessarily merit the wholesale 
rejection of the network-enabled cognition thesis; rather, they point to the limits of the current 
state-of-the-art and identify the targets of many ongoing research initiatives in the network and 
information sciences. In addition to highlighting the importance of current research and technology 
development efforts, the thesis of network-enabled cognition also suggests a number of areas for 
future research. These include the formation and maintenance of online trust relationships, the 
subjective assessment of information credibility and the  long-term impact of network access on 
human psychological and cognitive functioning. The nascent discipline of web science is, we suggest, 
suitably placed to begin an exploration of these issues. 
1  Introduction 
The advent of large-scale information networks and portable computing devices has exerted a major 
influence on many spheres of human activity. Within the space of a generation, the internet has 
largely transformed the way we work and communicate. But could this new network-enabled world 
change  more  than  the  general  structure  of  our  everyday  activities?  Could  its  transformative 
potential extend beyond the realms of the economic and the social to encompass the realms of the 
psychological and the cognitive? Is the internet capable of fundamentally transfiguring the space of 
human thought and reason, and, if so, what is the nature of this influence? In this paper, we begin to 
explore these questions by examining the  extent to which  notions of  environmentally-extended 
cognition apply to the world of network-enabled information appliances and network-accessible 2 
 
resources (NARs
1). We argue that, under certain circumstances, the informational and technological 
elements of a large-scale information network, such as the World Wide Web (WWW), can form part 
of the material substrate that undergirds a human agent’s mental states and processes. Following 
Clark and Chalmers (1998), we argue that the causally-active physical vehicles of mind and cognition 
are not always housed entirely within the human body or the human brain; rather, they can (at least 
sometimes) extend beyond the bounds of skin and skull to encompass elements of the external 
technological environment.  
At the heart of our claim is the (rather radical) proposal that human mental states and processes can 
inhere in extended, extra-organismic systems that incorporate aspects of the external, technological 
environment. Claims about the distributed or environmentally-extended nature of human cognition 
are commonplace in the philosophical and cognitive scientific literature (Clark, 1997, 2003; Clark & 
Chalmers, 1998; Dennett, 1996; Haugeland, 1998; Hollan et al., 2000; Hutchins, 1995; Kirsh, 1996, 
2006; Norman, 1993; Rowlands, 2003; Wilson, 1994; Wilson & Clark, 2006), but the idea that most 
strongly characterizes our specific claim is that human mental states and processes are, in part, 
constituted by aspects of the external environment. This is the central idea behind the extended 
mind  hypothesis  (Clark  &  Chalmers,  1998).  If  the  hypothesis  is  true  then  the  opportunities  for 
technology-mediated  modes  of  cognitive  transformation  seem  significant,  for  inasmuch  as  our 
mental states and processes can be said to supervene on elements of the local environment then 
the manipulation of that environment can be seen as more-or-less akin to the direct manipulation of 
elements  of  the  human  mind.  According  to  the  extended  mind  hypothesis,  changes  to  the 
environment can, under certain circumstances, exert a profound influence on our long-term store of 
thoughts, beliefs, memories and knowledge. 
The extended mind hypothesis was initially formulated with respect to a number of technologically 
low-grade examples, mostly involving pen and paper artefacts. Our claim in the current paper is that 
the extended mind hypothesis can also apply to the realm of network-enabled devices (NEDs) and 
network-accessible information content (NAIC). Our specific claim is captured in the form of what we 
will refer to as the thesis of network-enabled cognition: 
Thesis of Network-Enabled Cognition: The technological and informational elements 
of a large-scale information network can, under certain circumstances, constitute 
part of the material supervenience base for an agent’s mental states and processes. 
The thesis of network-enabled cognition implies that the extended mind hypothesis is basically a 
true account of human cognition and that it can be used to both understand the cognitive impact of 
network  technologies  on  the  human  mind  as  well  as  guide  technology  development  efforts  in 
support of cognitive and epistemic augmentation. Its validity depends, of course, on the extent to 
which  the  extended  mind  hypothesis  actually  applies  to  situations  in  which  both  NEDs  (e.g. 
Smartphones, palm pilots, laptops, etc.) and NAIC are exploited by human agents as part of their 
daily  cognitive  endeavours.  And  herein  lies  the  key  challenge  to  the  thesis  of  network-enabled 
cognition, because it is by no means clear that extended mind accounts do apply in the case of 
network environments. One concern is that there are fundamental differences between the kind of 
cognitive/epistemic artefacts used to substantiate accounts of the extended mind (e.g. maps, pens, 
papers, slide rules, etc.) and the technological (i.e. NED) and informational (i.e. NAIC) components of 
                                                           
1 A network-accessible resource (NAR) is any resource that can be accessed by a network. It includes the 
notion of information content, web services, and web applications. 3 
 
a large-scale information network. Such differences include the availability, accessibility and quality 
of  the  information  components,  as  well  as  the  reliability  and  resilience  of  the  technological 
elements. There are also concerns about the fact that NARs exist within a common and contested 
space, one that is vulnerable to sabotage and subversion by cognitively hostile agents (Sterelny, 
2004).  Even  the  main  protagonists  in  the  extended  mind  debate  seem  to  eschew  (or  at  least 
downplay) the possibility that internet resources, such as Google, can fulfil the conditions required 
for basic forms of cognitive extension (Clark, 2006; Clark & Chalmers, 1998).  
The  key  challenge  then  is  to  assess  whether  the  thesis  of  network-enabled  cognition  can  be 
defended  against  claims  that  network  technologies  fail  to  meet  the  basic  criteria  for  cognitive 
extension. This is our primary objective in the current paper. We first provide an overview of the 
extended mind hypothesis and outline some of the criticisms that have been levied against it (see 
Section 2). We then review the criteria used to identify cases of genuine cognitive extension and 
assess the specific problems that arise when considering the application of these criteria to the 
various components of a network system (see Section 3). As we will see, most of the concerns about 
network technologies, from the perspective of the extended mind, centre on the issue of trust. In 
order to address this specific worry we propose a solution strategy that emphasizes the utilization of 
computational trust mechanisms and automatic information vetting procedures. 
Section 4 explores the idea that the active manipulation of external, extra-organismic resources is an 
essential element of environmentally-extended cognition. We suggest that in order for network 
system  components  to  be  constitutively-relevant  to  human  cognitive  processing  they  need  to 
provide  greater opportunities for  information manipulation and personalization. We additionally 
explore the notion that initiatives such as Web 2.0, which feature greater participatory opportunities 
than the conventional Web, can be harnessed to provide a greater degree of active restructuring and 
content personalization so as to meliorate episodes of network-mediated cognitive processing. 
Finally,  Section  5  summarizes  our  main  conclusions  and  contributions  to  the  scientific  and 
philosophical literature. Our main conclusion is that network technologies are, at least in principle, 
capable of meeting the criteria for cognitive extension, and, as such, they are apt for forms of bio-
technological  hybridization  that  promise  (or  threaten)  to  radically  transform  the  nature  of  our 
cognitive profiles. Such mergers, we suggest, introduce a range of issues for future research within 
the empirical framework of the network and information sciences. In particular, we argue that many 
of the issues concerning the impact of large-scale networks on human psycho-cognitive functioning 
are topics apt for exploration within the nascent discipline of web science (Berners-Lee et al., 2006b; 
Hendler et al., 2008).  
2  The Extended Mind 
In the attempt to understand human cognition, cognitive science has tended to focus on the brain as 
the  mechanistic  substrate  of  mental  phenomena.  Cognitive  processes,  as  well  as  the  familiar 
elements  of  mentalistic  discourse  –  the  mental  states  we  use  to  explain  and  predict  human 
behaviour – seem to be firmly located within the traditional biological boundaries of skin and skull. 
In contrast to this view, Clark and Chalmers (1998) argue that mental states and processes are not 
necessarily tied to the biological brain; they can instead extend into the external environment to 
incorporate a variety of external technological props, aids and artefacts. This thesis is referred to as 
the thesis of extended cognition, or, more commonly, the extended mind. Extended mind accounts 
typically focus on the way in which much real-world cognitive processing seems to depend on the 4 
 
exploitation of both bodily contingencies and aspects of the external environment (Clark, 1997). 
Thus, in solving long multiplication problems human agents typically resort to using pen and paper 
to store intermediate solutions as well as structure the overall sequence of information processing 
steps (Rumelhart et al., 1986). Similarly, in writing an academic paper the human agent is often 
engaged in a complex sequence of iterated interactions with a variety of external resources (word 
processors, books, post-it notes, marginalia, etc.) that, in conjunction with the operation of the 
human brain, serve to progressively restructure and refine a preliminary set of initial thoughts into a 
finished article. What these and other examples (Clark, 1997; Hutchins, 1995; Kirsh, 1995; Kirsh & 
Maglio,  1994)  highlight  is  the  importance  of  external  tools,  props  and  artefacts  in  shaping, 
augmenting and guiding cognitive processes. Indeed, the extended mind hypothesis argues that such 
external resources are not only supportive of cognition; they also form part of the very machinery 
that makes mind mechanistically possible. 
In developing the extended mind thesis, Clark and Chalmers (1998) introduce the notion of the 
parity principle. The parity principle states that: 
“…if, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, 
were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting it is part of 
the  cognitive  system,  then  that  part  of  the  world  is  (for  that  time)  part  of  the 
cognitive process.” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) 
It is this notion that enables Clark and Chalmers (1998) to treat the case of pen-and-paper-mediated 
long  multiplication  as  a  genuine  case  of  environmentally-extended  mathematical  reasoning. 
Similarly, the use of an external rotational device to manipulate falling zoids in the game of Tetris 
(see  Kirsh  &  Maglio,  1994)  emerges  as  a  genuine  instance  of  environmentally-extended  spatial 
reasoning. The basic idea is that the parity principle should be used to avoid prejudices and biases 
about the importance of the inner (neural) realm; it is intended, primarily, as a location-agnostic 
criterion for identifying the causally-active physical vehicles that undergird a particular mental state 
or process. 
Taken  as  a  basic  claim  about  the  importance  of  external  artefacts  to  adaptive  behavioural  and 
cognitive success, there is nothing particularly radical about the notion of the extended mind – many 
theorists have emphasized the importance of the broader social and technological environment in 
understanding human cognition  (e.g. Hollan et al., 2000; Hutchins, 1995; Kirsh, 1996; Suchman, 
1987).  What  makes  the  extended  mind  hypothesis  somewhat  unique  in  the  philosophical  and 
cognitive  scientific  literature  is  the  position  it  adopts  with  regard  to  mental  states,  specifically 
beliefs. According to Clark and Chalmers (1998), external resources can form part of the long-term 
store of dispositional beliefs and knowledge associated with a human agent, providing that such 
resources serve to guide sequences of thought and action in a manner that is functionally equivalent 
to information retrieved from long-term bio-memory. Take, as an example, a portable device that is 
used to store information about future meeting appointments. Inasmuch as the use of this device 
fulfils a number of conditions (more on which below) we are justified, so claim Clark and Chalmers 
(1998), in seeing the device as akin to a basic biological resource, such as memory. In providing 
information, the portable device serves the same causal role in coordinating action that the same 
information would do were it to be retrieved from long-term bio-memory, and, as such, the device 
can be treated as a store of long-term beliefs about the timing and location of future meeting 
appointments. According to the extended mind hypothesis, the technological accoutrements of the 5 
 
modern age – palm pilots, calculators, mobile phones, etc. – are not simply tools that support our 
cognitive endeavours; they are also (potentially at least) part of the material fabric that physically 
realizes  human  mental  states  and  processes.  Inasmuch  as  this  is  the  case,  the  transformative 
potential of network technologies and resources is indeed profound: by developing technologies 
that can be easily co-opted into the processing loops of an extended cognitive system, engineers are 
providing  opportunities  for  cognitive  extension  that  promise  (or  threaten)  to  transfigure  our 
traditional notions of cognitive and epistemic (i.e. knowledge-guided) competence. 
The extended mind hypothesis sounds controversial, and it is indeed the focus of an ongoing debate 
within the philosophical and cognitive science communities (Adams & Aizawa, 2001, 2007; Clark, 
2005; Clark, 2006; Clark, 2007; Menary, 2006; Rupert, 2004). One reason why the extended mind 
hypothesis may initially seem unpalatable is that many equate cognition with consciousness, and it 
seems  intuitively  wrong  to  insist  that  consciousness  could  supervene  on  a  motley  collection  of 
external artefacts. Harnad (2005), for example, disputes the claim that cognition could ever extend 
beyond the bounds of the body. He claims that “Cognition is thinking; it feels like something to think, 
and only those who can feel can think” (Harnad, 2005). Clark and Chalmers (1998) accept that the 
content of occurrent mental states may supervene on processes inside in the brain, but they reject 
the notion that feelings are important from the perspective of extended cognition: 
“…not every cognitive process, at least on standard usage, is a conscious process. It is 
widely accepted that all sorts of processes beyond the borders of consciousness play 
a  crucial  role  in  cognitive  processing:  in  the  retrieval  of  memories,  linguistic 
processes, and skill acquisition, for example. So the mere fact that external processes 
are  external  where  consciousness  is  internal  is  no  reason  to  deny  that  those 
processes are cognitive.” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998)  
Another (common) criticism of the extended mind hypothesis concerns the lack of any functional 
equivalence between a purely internal process (e.g. retrieving information from long-term biological 
memory)  and  a  process  that  involves  the  exploitation  of  an  external  resource  (e.g.  retrieving 
information from an electronic appointment scheduler)
2. The argument here is that a process like 
biological memory  involves more  than the static  retrieval of information items;   it  is an active, 
dynamic  process  that  both  benefits  and  suffers  from  the  vagaries  of mood, motivation  and 
contextual influences. The case of the portable appointment system doesn’t seem to fit this specific 
profile  of  performance  and  processing  constraints,  and  it  is  not,  therefore,  equivalent  to  bio-
memory. In responding to this criticism, it is important to recognize that nothing in the extended 
mind thesis commits us to saying that external resources are identical to the processing elements of 
the bio-cognitive system. Clearly they are not. What is important, however, is that the external 
resource plays the same functional role as inner resources in guiding and constraining action and 
decision-making.  Inasmuch  as  the  information  provided  by  the  appointment  scheduler  system 
guides and constrains behaviour in much the same way as it would do were it to be retrieved from 
long-term memory, it does seem sufficient to regard the external information as part of the human 
agent’s repository of knowledge and beliefs about future appointments (see also Clark, 2006). Of 
course, the notion of functional role similarity is not necessarily without its problems. In particular, it 
is  important  to  understand  the  precise  way  in  which  inner  and  outer  resources  play  the  same 
functional  role  in  guiding  action  and  decision-making  –  simply  saying  that  they  are  functionally 
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equivalent, but not at the process level, seems uncomfortably vague. We suggest that the notion of 
functional similarity should be grounded in the extent to which the external resources support the 
expression of behaviours that warrant the ascription of mental states to the agent in question. That 
is to say, what makes an external resource part of the cognitive machinery of an agent is the fact 
that it plays a causally-active role in the production of behaviours that are the legitimate targets of 
belief, and, more generally, thought ascription.   
Other criticisms of the extended mind thesis concern the location of cognitive and computational 
control (Butler, 1998), the distinction between intrinsic and derived content (Adams & Aizawa, 2001, 
2007), and worries about the vulnerability of external resources to damage and social manipulation 
(Sterelny,  2004).  All  of  these  concerns  have  been  addressed  by  Clark  in  a  number  of  recent 
publications (Clark, 2005; Clark, 2006; Clark, 2007). The specific concern raised by Sterelny (2004) 
about the vulnerability to active sabotage is addressed in more detail below. 
3  Extended Cognition and Network Technologies 
One of the biggest worries about the extended mind hypothesis is that it is overly liberal concerning 
what can and cannot be considered part of the cognitive profile of a human agent. Clearly, not all of 
the technologies or external resources that we encounter are apt to engage in the kind of bio-
technological hybridization envisioned by the extended mind hypothesis. As Clark (1997) argues 
“There  would  be  little  value  in  an  analysis  that  credited  me  with  knowing  all  the  facts  in  the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica just because I paid the monthly instalments and found space for it my 
garage” (pg. 217). Similarly, it would be foolish to equate my personal body of knowledge as co-
extensive with the contents of the internet simply because I have an internet-enabled mobile phone. 
What, then, are the conditions under which we count a set of external resources as participating in 
genuine cases of cognitive extension? In answering this question, Clark and Chalmers (1998) propose 
the following set of criteria: 
1.  “…the  resource  must  be  available  and  typically  invoked”  (Clark,  2006).  [Availability 
Criterion] 
2.  “…any  information…retrieved  from  [the  non-biological  resource  must]  be  more-or-less 
automatically  endorsed.  It  should  not  usually  be  subject  to  critical  scrutiny  (unlike  the 
opinions  of  other  people,  for  example).  It  should  be  deemed  about  as  trustworthy  as 
something retrieved clearly from biological memory” (Clark, 2006). [Trust Criterion] 
3.  “…information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as and when required” 
(Clark, 2006). [Accessibility Criterion] 
As an example of a system that meets all these criteria, Clark and Chalmers (1998) present the case 
of a tightly coupled system involving a human agent and a conventional (paper) notebook. The 
notebook, Clark and Chalmers (1998) argue, represents the kind of portable device that supports the 
retrieval of facts and memoranda in a way that is similar to internal memory (recall the discussion 
about functional role similarity in the previous section). As such, the notebook-plus-person system 
represents a genuine case of cognitive extension.  
Do the elements of a network system, i.e. NEDs, NARs and NAIC, fulfil (or at least potentially fulfil) 
the  criteria  associated  with  an  extended  mind?  In  answering  this  question  it  is  important  to 
understand the factors that might motivate a distinction between the case of the notebook-plus-
person  system  and  the  case  of  the  network-plus-person  system.  If  there  are  no  significant 7 
 
differences between the two systems then there is no real point to argue – a network-plus-person 
system is just as capable as constituting a genuine case of cognitive extension as the notebook-plus-
person system. Unfortunately, however, there are many differences between the two cases. In the 
case  of  NAIC,  significant  differences  include:  physical  location  (remote  vs.  local),  extent  of 
information sharing (NAIC is typically shared and used by multiple individuals), provenance (NAIC is, 
in many cases, created by agents who are not necessarily the same as those who consume the 
information), information quality (NAIC may be of more variable quality than the notebook-derived 
information) and degree of personalization (NAIC is seldom personalized). Similarly, there are a host 
of differences concerning the features of the physical device (for example, notebook versus mobile 
computing  device)  used  to  access  information.  These  include  power  dependence,  resistance  to 
damage, reliability of information provision, ease of use, and so on. What significance do these 
differences have in terms of the validity of the thesis of network-enabled cognition? The general 
consensus in the literature seems to be that network systems make poor candidates for genuine 
cases  of  cognitive  extension.  Thus  in  considering  the  extent  to  which  the  internet  fulfils  the 
aforementioned criteria, Clark and Chalmers (1998) argue: 
“The Internet is likely to fail on multiple counts, unless I am unusually computer-
reliant, facile with the technology, and trusting, but information in certain files on my 
computer may qualify.”
3 
In contrast to this rather pessimistic conclusion, we suggest that near future extensions of systems 
like the internet could fulfil the criteria for cognitive extension (although we also acknowledge the 
limitations of extant systems). In subsequent sections we explore the general profile of network 
usage contexts with respect to the extended mind criteria outlined above. 
3.1  Availability & Use 
The first of Clark and Chalmer’s criteria (1998) concerns the extent to which an external resource
4 is 
both available and typically used by a human agent. In order for the informational and technological 
elements of a network system to feature as part of an extended cognitive system they should, 
according to the availability criterion, be more-or-less constantly available for us. Part of the concern 
here relates to the portability of the device used to access information – the more portable the 
device, the more likely it is to feature as part of an extended cognitive system. Clearly, the current 
state-of-the-art in mobile computing features a number of devices that are about as portable as a 
typical (paper) notebook (the device used in the original account of the extended mind hypothesis). 
Well  known  examples  include  Personal  Digital  Assistants  (PDAs),  Smartphones  and  ultra-mobile 
personal computers. In terms of the extended mind hypothesis, therefore, portability does not seem 
                                                           
3 The difference between local and remote files is presumably important here because of accessibility (can we 
access the information in a suitable timeframe?), reliability (can we always access the information when we 
need it?), and trust-related (we are more likely to trust local information than we are information stored in a 
large-scale, publicly-accessible information repository) concerns. 
4 Clark’s notion of a ‘resource’ here is not necessarily equivalent to our notion of a NAR (a web service or 
institutional website, for example). It is (we think) roughly analogous to the device used to access online 
information content (i.e. a NED, such as a Smartphone). In the case of a paper notebook there is a tight 
coupling between the resource used to access information content and the information content itself – the 
location of the information content is always the same as the location of the notebook. This is not necessarily 
the case in network-enabled environments; the physical location of information content need not be the same 
as the device used to access the information.    8 
 
to be a major problem. In fact, mobile computing devices are already in widespread use and they 
have largely replaced notebooks and filofaxes as devices that guide daily action and decision-making. 
Another concern that may be raised about network resources is their vulnerability to environmental 
damage. The paper notebook seems somewhat more resilient here as an information access device 
simply because it does not rely on a host of sensitive electronic components. Of course, claims about 
the differential vulnerability of devices to environmental damage are not entirely unproblematic: it 
is not clear that modern electronic devices are any more or less vulnerable to damage than the 
typical resources (e.g. pen, paper, slide rules, maps, etc.) mentioned in extended mind accounts. In 
addition, it is worth pointing out that we do not regard the vulnerability of our own nervous systems 
– systems that are, in fact, highly vulnerable to the ravages of injury, disease, trauma, fatigue, etc. – 
as necessarily undermining their status as legitimate parts of a cognitive system. One thing that 
determines the vulnerability of a device to physical damage is the extent to which it is shielded 
(actively or otherwise) from harm. We suggest, therefore, that while a certain degree of physical 
resilience  is  important,  a  further  factor  is  the  extent  to  which  a  device  is  valued  and  actively 
protected by its human user. Devices that play a cognitively and epistemically-potent role in the life 
of a human agent are likely to elicit the kind of protective actions that extenuates the significance of 
any physical vulnerabilities
5. 
Concerns about power consumption and battery life are also relevant to a consideration of resource 
availability and resource usage issues. One o f the obvious differences between a paper notebook 
and a typical NED relates to the reliance of the latter on a source of power – cases where patterns of 
resource usage are dictated by power considerations are, unfortunately, all too familiar. One option 
here is to accept the current shortcomings of NEDs with respect to power constraints, but to insist 
that  such  shortcomings  represent  the  active  targets  of  ongoing  technology  development 
programmes. A number of recent developments seem of interest and value here. These include the 
development of energy efficient devices, the exploitation of novel power generation mechanisms 
(for example, kinetic energy solutions
6), and the development of novel energy transfer and power 
sharing solutions (e.g. wireless power transfer solutions (Kurs et al., 2007)). 
In summary, when comparing NEDs with non-electronic physical devices, it does seem as though 
there are some cases where NEDs might fail to fulfil the availability criterion. This is despite the fact 
that the portability of modern mobile computing solutions is roughly equivalent  to, if not  greater 
than, the technologically low-grade examples used  in accounts of the extended mind . Particular 
problems include the power constraints of current NEDs and their relatively greater vulnerability to 
damage when compared to non-electronic devices. These problems do not, however, seem to rule 
out the possibility that NEDs could contribute to cognitive extension; rather, they seem to reflect the 
limitations and operating characteristics of a particular class of device, namely that associated with 
the current state-of-the-art. To our mind, once these problems have been ameliorated by  (near) 
                                                           
5 It should also be pointed out, of course, that network resources are not always more vulnerable to damage 
and  destruction  than  their  non-networked,  non-electronic  counterparts.  The  existence  of  remote  back-up 
capabilities  means  that  networked  information  is  somewhat  more  resilient  than  information  stored  in  a 
physical notebook. The tight coupling between the notebook and its information contents means that if the 
notebook is lost or stolen then its contents are also lost. This is not the case with NAIC, which is largely 
immune to localised forms of damage, destruction and theft. 
6 http://www.m2epower.com/ 9 
 
future innovations, there does not seem to be any principled reason why NEDs could not fulfil the 
conditions of the availability criterion, at least to the same extent as a non-electronic artefact.   
3.2  Trust 
The second of Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) criteria concerns the notion of automatic endorsability or 
trust. The idea here seems to be that information retrieved from external, non-biological resources 
should  always  be  trusted  to  the  same  extent  as  information  retrieved  clearly  from  biological 
memory. This is an interesting criterion, because it may seem that we can never trust external 
resources to the same extent as we trust our own internal (neural) resources. Given that most NAIC 
exists in a shared and largely public space, it seems inevitable that it will be subject to greater critical 
scrutiny  and  epistemic  vetting  simply  because  the  possibility  for  deception  or  deliberate 
manipulation seems greater in an external, shared space than it does for the inner, private realm.  
In considering the trust criterion it is important to be clear exactly what is meant by the terms ‘trust’ 
and ‘automatic endorsability’. Trust has been the focus of considerable attention in the human-
computer interaction literature (see Golbeck, 2008), but it is notable that little consensus exists as to 
what the term actually means (Corritore et al., 2003). Corritore et al (2003) therefore define (online) 
trust as an expectation that one’s vulnerabilities will not be exploited, but it is unclear whether this 
definition is compatible with the notion of trust used by Clark and Chalmers (1998). The notion of 
automatic endorsability is similarly vague. It is probably intended to mean that information should 
be automatically accepted by an agent without critical scrutiny or cross-checking. This mode of 
operation  seems  to  best  characterize  the  way  we  treat  information  retrieved  clearly  from  bio-
memory,  and  the  same  mode  of  operation  should  apply,  it  seems,  to  cases  where  we  rely  on 
external information to guide sequences of thought and action.  
Although some commentators have questioned whether externally-derived information can ever be 
treated in the same way as internally-derived information, it is by no means clear that human agents 
always  treat  externally-derived  information  in  a  highly  cautious  manner.  The  psychological 
phenomenon  of  change  blindness,  for  example,  attests  to  the  fact  that  people  are,  at  times, 
remarkably vulnerable to certain forms of deception (Simons & Levin, 1997) (our susceptibility to 
stage magic tricks is surely a further example of this vulnerability (Kuhn et al., in press; Macknik et 
al.,  in  press)).  Such  vulnerabilities  could  not  be  exploited,  it  seems,  if  humans  always  treated 
externally-derived information with a high degree of critical scrutiny and scepticism.  
In terms of the everyday use of network resources, it is unclear to what extent externally- and 
internally-derived information is treated in the same way. The issue of whether information from 
network resources is ever deemed as trustworthy as information retrieved from biological memory 
is a moot point because, to our knowledge, there have been no empirical studies that would shed 
light on the issue
7. What does seem likely is that we do not uniformly trust or distrust external 
resources (including network ones); rather, our trust evaluations are highly variable and are based 
on a range of factors associated with the reliability, quality and credibility of online information 
content (Corritore et al., 2003). The key issue (it seems to us) is not whether we treat  external 
information differently to internal information (to which the answer is surely sometimes we do and 
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sometimes  we  don’t);  it  is  more  a  case  of  when,  and  under  what  circumstances,  we  treat 
internal/external information in different ways. In answering this question it is clearly important to 
understand the psychological mechanisms that contribute to information reliability and credibility 
assessments  in  network  environments.  It  is  also  important  to  understand  the  processes  that 
undergird the formation and maintenance of subjective trust evaluations in online contexts. Such 
issues  are  the  current  focus  of  research  in  the  human-computer  interaction  and  web  science 
communities, and we expect the results of this research to further our understanding of the kind of 
conditions under which genuine cases of network-enabled cognitive extension can be established.  
One further point of interest with regard to the trust criterion is the work of Kim Sterelny (2004). 
Sterelny (2004) is one of the main supporters of the claim that externally-derived information is 
never trusted to the same extent as internally-derived information. According to Sterelny (2004), the 
greater vulnerability of external resources to sabotage and subversion means that agents need to 
deploy strategies that safeguard against the possibility of deception and deliberate manipulation 
whenever they retrieve information from the external environment. This requirement to deploy 
safeguards is significant, Sterelny (2004) argues, because it results in an increase in cognitive load 
and undermines the extent to which external resources can be treated in a similar fashion to internal 
resources.  
In considering Sterelny’s (2004) claim we suggest that inasmuch as the use of external resources 
does indeed increase cognitive load
8, the use of computational trust mechanisms and  information 
quality evaluation techniques can be used to reduce this load. In particular, we suggest that much of 
the cognitive load incurred by agents in network usage contexts is likely to derive from uncertainty 
about either 1) the trustworthiness of an external resource or 2) the accuracy, reliability and quality 
of externally-derived information. Both these sources of load can be attenuated, we argue, by the 
use of computational trust mechanisms and automatic information vetting procedures (e.g. Adler et 
al., 2007; McGuinness et al., 2006) . One strategy for reducing load is to rely on techniques that 
evaluate online information resources and provide explicit feedback about the quality, reliability and 
trustworthiness of specific information items. This is the approach adopted by Adler et al  (2007) in 
the case of Wikipedia content. Another strategy is to highlight the information items that support a 
user’s subjective assessment of the quality, reliability and credibility of information content. Liu 
(2004) thus notes that information about academic institutions plays a key role in user’s assessments 
of the credibility of scholarly information content. He suggests that such information should be 
highlighted in order to support user credibility assessments. Finally, it is clear that robust security 
mechanisms are needed to protect online information content. One of the concerns of Sterelny 
(2004) is that information in the public domain is vulnerable to tampering. When such tampering is 
                                                           
8 It is worth pointing out that the use of external resources does not always seem to entail a correlative 
increase in cognitive load. In their analysis of the use of an external rotational device in the game of Tetris, for 
example, Kirsh and Maglio (1994) calculate that the physical rotation of a shape through 90 degrees takes 
about 100 milliseconds, plus about 200 milliseconds to actually select the rotation button. To achieve the same 
result by mental rotation alone takes about 1000 milliseconds. This seems to be a clear case where the use of 
an  environmental  resource  reduces  the  cognitive  burden  associated  with  a  problem-solving  task.  Daniel 
Dennett  (1996)  argues  that  such  forms  of  environmental  off-loading  constitute  a  key  feature  of  human 
cognition: “The primary source *of our greater intelligence+. . . is our habit of off-loading as much as possible of 
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made  more  or  less  impossible  by  security  protection  schemes,  one  need  not  worry  that  the 
information stored therein will be contaminated. 
Our  basic  claim,  then,  is  that  inasmuch  as  the  use  of  network  resources entails  an  increase  in 
cognitive load, computational trust mechanisms and automatic information vetting procedures can 
be used to attenuate
9 the cognitive burden. Inasmuch as such mechanisms facilitate the automatic 
endorsement (or rejection) of information content, they are, we argue, important elements of the 
psycho-technological matrix that supports extended cognition in a network-enabled environment.  
3.3  Accessibility  
The third of Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) criteria concerns the notion of accessibility. The idea here is 
that information should be easily and readily accessible, perhaps no less so than the information 
contained in biological memory. At the heart of the accessibility criterion is the notion of information 
access cost. As the costs (e.g. time and cognitive effort) associated with information access increase 
then it seems less likely that external information will be seen to count towards an individual’s long-
term store of knowledge and beliefs.  
In empirical analyses it has been observed that systematic manipulations of information access cost 
can influence the kind of cognitive strategy used by human subjects to solve a problem. Gray and Fu 
(2004),  for  example,  show  that  the  choice  between  an  internal  (memory-based)  and  external 
(perceptual-motor) strategy tends to be guided by the relative costs and benefits associated with 
each strategy (in this case measured in terms of time). If the cost of implementing some perceptual-
motor routine  is  less than  the  cost  associated  with  the  retrieval of  information  from  biological 
memory  then  information  from  the external  store will  be  utilized  in  preference  to  the  internal 
information. What these results seem to suggest is that the extent to which external information 
resources are factored into cognitive processing is heavily reliant on a delicate trade-off between the 
relative  costs  of  accessing  internal  and  external  information.  In  order  for  external  information 
resources to become reliably incorporated into problem-solving routines, we should expect their 
access costs to be minimal; the costs, at least, should be no greater than the time and (perhaps 
effort) spent in accessing internal information
10.  
How do network resources fare with respect to the accessibility criterion? At first blush there seems 
to be a rather alarming number of problems. The usability of the network device, the time taken to 
download information content, the vulnerability of the network connection to the vagaries of  the 
                                                           
9 This reduction in cognitive effort is consistent with the approach proposed by Parsell (2006). He argues that 
one approach to reducing the increased cognitive load associated with the vetting of external information is to 
off-load  such  vetting  mechanisms  to  the  external  environment.  Our  advocacy  of  computational  trust 
mechanisms represents one potential realization of this proposal. 
10 One thing that is unclear here is the timeframe within which external  information should be retrieved so as 
to count towards an agent’s long-term store of knowledge and beliefs. Clearly, if an agent takes too long to 
access task-relevant information then it is doubtful that they can be credited with knowing or believing that 
information. But  what counts as too long  in this situation? One option is to fall back on basic biological 
standards and to insist that information should be retrieved as quickly as information from biological memory. 
The  problem  here  is  that  biological  recall  can  sometimes  be  quite  variable.  Another  option  is  to  rely  on 
standards in the artificial intelligence community. In talking about the SOAR symbol processing system, for 
example, Rosenbloom et al (1992) refer to the ‘cognitive band’ – the timeframe between 10 milliseconds to 10 
seconds in which most aspects of deliberative thought seem to occur. Such a timeframe is, we argue, likely to 
be close to the temporal window within which NAIC needs to be made available in order for mental state 
ascription to have any explanatory virtue. 12 
 
radio propagation environment, the effort involved in locating information (e.g. formulating a search 
query) and the difficulty of isolating relevant information once it has been downloaded: all seem to 
be factors contributing to an increase in information access cost. We do not have space to address 
all these issues here; suffice to say that (as with the availability and trust criterion) the focus of many 
research  and  technology  efforts,  particularly  in  the  context  of  the  WWW,  are  geared  towards 
improving user access to online information. Work of particular note here includes the development 
of  natural  language  question-answering  systems  (Lopez  et  al.,  2005;  Tablan  et  al.,  2008),  user-
friendly  semantic  information  browsers  (schraefel  et  al.,  2005),  the  use  of  sub-vocalization 
techniques  to  support  Web  navigation  (Jorgensen  &  Binsted,  2005)  and  the  use  of  intelligent 
forward caching and data charging mechanisms to mitigate download delays and the effects of 
intermittent network connectivity (Cherniack et al., 2001). New technologies in the field of wearable 
computing are also likely to enhance our access to information. Mobile device eyewear systems
11, 
for  example,  display  information  directly  to  a  user’s  visual  field  using  conventional  eyewear 
equipment (e.g. spectacles). Some of the applications envisioned for this new technology include 
location-aware  social  network  services,  real-world  visual  overlays  for  environment  navigation, 
battlefield situation awareness displays, and immersive virtual reality systems for education and 
entertainment. Such systems tend to reduce the cost of information access, and, we argue, they 
introduce  new  ways  in  which  NAIC  can  be  co-opted  into  the  information  processing  loops  of 
cognitively-extended agents.  
Notwithstanding the introduction of these emerging  technologies, many would argue (ourselves 
included) that the real source of the information access cost problem (at least in the context of the 
WWW) lies in the way in which information content is embedded in particular source documents 
(e.g. web pages) typically using the medium of natural language. This document-centric mode of 
information encoding is highly impractical for the kind of information access that is likely to be 
required  in  the  cases of network-extended minds. For  what  such minds  require,  we  argue,  are 
flexible modes of data integration, aggregation and presentation, in conjunction with an ability to 
gear information retrieval operations to suit the task-specific needs and requirements of particular 
problem-solving contexts. Think about the problem of accessing factual information from a web-
accessible  resource,  such  as  Wikipedia.  Even  if  the  delays  associated  with  document  retrieval 
(downloading) and presentation are resolved, the user is still confronted with the onerous task of 
surveying the document for relevant information content. In most cases this requires the user to 
scroll through the web page and process large amounts of largely irrelevant content in order to 
identify the small amount of information that is actually needed. This is a very inefficient means of 
information access. Even if the user tries to isolate specific information items for use on multiple 
occasions  they  cannot  do  this  without  reliably  fixing  the  physical  location  of  the  information 
(perhaps by copying the required information to a local resource
12).  
One solution to this problem  of resource-centric information embedding  is to adopt the kind of 
approach to data modelling advocated by the Semantic Web community (Berners-Lee et al., 2001; 
Shadbolt et al., 2006). In this case, domain ontologies are used to represent information in a manner 
that is largely independent of specific presentational formats or usage contexts. Commenting on the 
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12 Links to sections within the page will not work because Wikipe dia, like most Web 2.0 applications, features 
dynamic content, and the physical  location of specific information items is liable to change across multiple  
usage contexts. 13 
 
relationship of the Semantic Web to the conventional Web, Berners-Lee et al (2006b) write “The SW 
[Semantic Web] tries to get people to make their data available to others, and to add links to make 
them accessible by link following. So the vision of the SW is as an extension of Web principles from 
documents to data” (pg. 18). This shift of emphasis (from linked documents to linked data) is, we 
suggest, a necessary step in order to establish the kind of selective data integration, aggregation, 
and filtering that facilitates cost-effective modes of information access and undergirds cognitively 
potent forms bio-technological integration. 
3.4  Summary 
The extended mind hypothesis features three criteria that can be used to judge whether an external 
resource constitutes part of the cognitive profile of an intelligent system. We have suggested that 
there is no principled reason why the technological and informational components of a network 
system should not fulfil these criteria. This does not mean, however, that genuine cases of cognitive 
hybridization  are  apparent  in  contemporary  usage  contexts.  In  many  cases,  current  network 
technology  seems  to  fall  short  of  the  conditions  deemed  necessary  for  cognitive  extension. 
Particular worries concern the power characteristics of mobile devices, the resilience of wireless 
networks to environmental challenges and the accessibility of information content vis-à-vis flexible 
modes of information integration, aggregation and presentation. Interestingly, many (if not all) of 
these shortcomings are the targets of current technology design and development efforts, and this 
highlights  a  deep  complementarity  between  the  requirements  for  cognitive  extension  and  the 
general trend of network technology evolution. Mobile devices are thus beginning to exploit new 
forms of energy conservation and power generation (Kurs et al., 2007), while initiatives such as the 
Semantic Web (Berners-Lee et al., 2001; Shadbolt et al., 2006) promise to deliver new approaches to 
data modelling, ones that liberate data from existing resources and make it available for cognitively 
potent forms of user interaction.    
4  Network-Mediated Cognitive Processing 
As alluded to in Section 2, the notion of the extended mind applies to both mental states and 
cognitive processes. The kind of role that many network systems are likely to play, at least in their 
current form, is as an environmentally-extended store of long-term knowledge and dispositional 
beliefs. It is entirely plausible, we suggest, to see elements of a network as effectively expanding the 
epistemic or belief profile of a human agent (i.e. the kind of knowledge and beliefs the agent is 
presumed to possess), but it is much harder to see how (extant) network systems could form an 
intrinsic  part  of  the  cognitive  processing  profile  of  such  an  agent.  One  problem  is  that  NARs, 
particularly those found on the conventional Web, seem to lack the kind of interactive capabilities 
that would make them sure-fire candidates for incorporation into extended cognitive systems. Thus, 
when we confront examples of environmentally-extended cognitive processing, whether it be in the 
area of memory, perception or reasoning (see Rowlands, 2003), what we seem to encounter are 
cases in which brain, body and world form a closely-coupled system, one in which aspects of the 
external environment are manipulated so as to influence subsequent internal processing. The case 
of Scrabble is a case in point (Kirsh, 1995). What we see in the case of Scrabble is an iterative 
sequence of body-world interactions in which aspects of the external environment (the Scrabble 
tiles) are manipulated so as to better exploit the computational profile of the human brain, i.e. its 
capacity for rapid pattern-recognition and pattern-completion. The problem of word search in this 
case  seems  to  have  been  partially  transformed  from  an  exhaustive  search  of  the  space  of 14 
 
cryptarithmetic  solutions  into  something  more  akin  to  perceptual  pattern  recognition  and 
completion: candidate or partial word solutions that are encountered in the perceptual input serve 
to  guide  tile  manipulation  actions  in  ways  that  facilitate  the  further  derivation  of  candidate 
solutions. Kirsh  and Maglio (1994) argue that such environmental restructuring is a common feature 
of human problem-solving. They argue for a distinction between two types of action: pragmatic and 
epistemic action. The goal of pragmatic action is to alter the world in such a way as to bring one 
physically  closer  to  a  goal  (e.g.  one  must  boil  water  before  making  a  cup  of  tea).  The  goal  of 
epistemic action, in contrast, is to adapt or modify the environment in ways that better suit the 
problem-solving profile of the agent in question. It is a type of action that is executed in order to 
make the external environment more congenial to cognitive processing (Kirsh, 1996). 
The question is to what extent do network resources support the kind of interactive coupling seen in 
cases of environmentally-extended cognitive processing? What seems relatively clear is that many 
extant NARs, particularly those associated with the conventional Web, do not provide the same 
kinds of opportunities for user interaction and manipulation as do many real-world artefacts – a user 
cannot interact with a standard web page in quite the same way as they can with an abacus or a 
slide  rule,  and  this,  we  suspect,  limits  the  range  of  cognitively  potent  interactions  that  a 
conventional web page can support. A related problem here is that many web pages feature fixed 
information content that cannot be (easily) adapted, modified or restructured to suit the end user’s 
(task-specific) needs and requirements. As Sterelny (2004) argues: 
“External tools are in the public domain, and that has implications for the cognitive 
resources  needed  to  make  effective  use  of  those  tools.  Jointly  used  epistemic 
artefacts  are  often  less  than  optimal  for  any  of  their  users:  they  need  to  be 
individualised at each use.” (Sterelny, 2004)  
While  it  is  certainly  true  that  current  opportunities  for  personalization  and  customization  are 
somewhat limited in the context of the conventional web, there are a number of efforts underway 
that promise to change this. The advent of Web 2.0, for example, has increased the extent to which 
communities can adapt both the content and structure of web-accessible information to suit their 
information  processing  needs.  Web  2.0  technologies  promote  greater  user  participation  in  the 
process of editing, uploading and publishing information content, and they therefore enable users to 
play a greater role in structuring and restructuring  Web content so as to better support online 
problem  solving.  Nevertheless,  it  is  not  entirely  clear  that  the  kind  of  interactive  opportunities 
provided by the current (or even the near-future) Web will necessarily suffice to support the kind of 
cognitive processing made possible by traditional cognitive artefacts. One possibility is that existing 
NAIC could be exploited in the context of more interactive environments, although the development 
of such environments probably depends on more flexible modes of data integration, access, and 
combination than is currently the case. This suggests another advantage of the ‘data liberalization’ 
approach countenanced by the Semantic Web: it makes information more amenable to the kinds of 
multi-functional, multi-purpose applications that will be needed to support robust forms of user-
centred information manipulation and information visualization.  
Irrespective of the extent to which interactive technologies support online cognitive processing, an 
ability to interact with NARs is important for another reason. Inasmuch as interactive technologies 
increase the participatory nature of large-scale information networks, they may provide a potential 
solution to the worry that NAIC cannot be trusted to the same extent as internal information (see 15 
 
Section 3.2). With the advent of more interactive capabilities, users have an ability to create and 
maintain their own personalized repositories of task-relevant information. In many cases the content 
of such repositories will have been vetted, checked and approved on previous occasions; it is thus 
apt  for  the  kind  of  automatic  endorsement  required  by  extended  mind  accounts  (providing,  of 
course, that security mechanisms are sufficiently robust so as to ensure against deliberate tampering 
and manipulation). 
5  Conclusion 
The conventional view in cognitive science is that much of the physical machinery of the human 
mind is located firmly inside the human head. In contrast to this view, the extended mind hypothesis 
posits that body and world can sometimes form part of the machinery by which mind and cognition 
are physically realized; body and world hence form part of the local material supervenience base for 
mental states and processes. The notion of the extended mind is important because it focuses 
attention on the way in which the facts of material embodiment and environmental embedding (see 
Haugeland, 1998) may come to shape and scaffold much of what we would otherwise see as the 
result  of  purely  internal  processing.  Once  we  recognize  the  contribution  of  the  outer,  extra-
organismic resources, our understanding of the representational and computational profile of the 
human brain begins to change. For what seems important from this fresh standpoint is the ability of 
the brain to gear its computational and representational resources to the exploitation (and creation) 
of  external  resources  that  complement,  enhance  and  occasionally  transform  its  computational 
capabilities (Clark, 1997). The extended mind hypothesis also focuses attention on the opportunities 
for technology-mediated modes of cognitive augmentation and enhancement. Indeed, one of the 
distinctive features of the human mind may very well lie in its  ability  to harness  the power of 
external resources so as to turbo-charge its, otherwise limited, bio-cognitive capabilities. “Human 
capacities for advanced reason,” Clark (2001) thus argues, “depend heavily on the effects of a special 
kind of hybridization [one] in which human brains  enter into an increasingly potent cascade of 
genuinely symbiotic relationships with knowledge-rich artefacts and technologies”.  
Given that network systems are now an increasingly pervasive aspect of our lives, coupled with the 
fact  that  systems  such  as  the  internet  have  largely  transformed  our  access  to  information  and 
knowledge, it seems reasonable to ask whether the notion of the extended mind applies to the 
elements of a large-scale, distributed network system, such as the WWW. We claim that there is, in 
principle, no reason to doubt this claim – the informational and technological elements of a network 
system can form part of the material supervenience base for an agent’s mental states and processes. 
If this claim is true then the transformative potential of networks with respect to human cognition is 
indeed profound: the development of new forms of network-enabled capability can be seen as 
effectively augmenting and extending our basic cognitive and epistemic profiles. 
In  order  to  make  the  thesis  of  network-enabled  cognition  stick,  we  need  to  evaluate  network 
systems with respect to a number of criteria (see Section 3). In particular, if NAIC is to count as part 
of  our  long-term  store  of  knowledge  and  dispositional  beliefs  then  it  is  important  that  the 
information should be typically used, sufficiently accessible to guide real-time action and decision-
making, and more-or-less automatically endorsed. We have seen that if we apply the extended mind 
criteria to extant network systems, most notably the WWW, we encounter a number of apparent 
problems. These include (but are obviously not limited to) the extent to which NEDs can be relied on 
to  provide  access  to  online  information  as  and  when  it  is  needed,  the  extent  to  which  online 16 
 
information can be made available for the purposes of guiding real-time thought and action, and the 
extent to which network resources can be trusted to more-or-less the same degree as personal, 
biological resources. Rather than seeing these shortcomings as warranting the wholesale rejection of 
the thesis of network-enabled cognition, we have suggested that these shortcomings in fact reflect 
the limits of the current state-of-the-art. The shortcomings also identify many of the scientific and 
technology development goals of ongoing research programmes in the network and information 
sciences. There is, as such, a significant (and perhaps not coincidental) overlap between the kind of 
technological advances required to effect potent forms of network-based cognitive hybridization 
and the goals of many academic and commercial research programmes. Future developments in 
network systems technology and mobile computing can be expected, we argue, to address shortfalls 
in the existing accessibility and availability of online resources, and this will constitute a major step 
forward in terms of our ability to treat network elements as components of an extended cognitive 
system. Of particular interest are technologies that serve to reduce the effort required to retrieve 
and process information from network sources. Thus we see highly portable systems, such as Mobile 
Device Eyewear, establishing a much greater level of perceptual intimacy between human agents 
and  network  resources  than  has  heretofore  been  the  case.  Similarly,  we  see  advances  in  sub-
vocalization  techniques  (Jorgensen  &  Binsted,  2005)  and/or  neuro-interactive  technologies
13  as 
important steps in enhancing our access to online information and promoting  greater levels of 
cognitive inter-penetration between network resources and the human mind.  
Aside from the problems of access and reliability, some of the most significant issues for the thesis of 
network-enabled cognition  seem to  relate to  the notions  of  trust and automatic endorsability.  
Automatic endorsement is deemed to be important because it seems to characterize the way we 
treat information retrieved  (clearly)  from bio-memory. If we  were to  confront  a  system (either 
internal or external) in which an agent treated all retrieved information in a highly cautious manner 
then it seems unlikely that we would see the system as counting as part of the belief or knowledge 
base of the agent in question. Rather, it is probably the case that we would see the external resource 
as a separate entity, something akin to a  “perceptually-consulted independent oracle” (Wilson & 
Clark, 2006). As part of our analysis of network-enabled cognition we encountered a number of 
problems with the notions of trust and automatic endorsability. Firstly, the concepts of trust and 
automatic endorsability are somewhat vague and ill-defined. The notion of trust, in particular, seems 
to attract considerable confusion, and there does not appear to be a widely accepted definition of 
trust in the computer science and human-computer interaction literature (see Corritore et al., 2003). 
Secondly, there is a dearth of empirical studies that would otherwise shed light on the extent to 
which NAIC is (or is not) automatically endorsed. It seems clear that people’s trust evaluations for 
various online resources can vary as a function of multiple factors (see Corritore et al., 2003), but 
this does not, in itself, seem to tell us anything about automatic endorsability: is information from a 
highly trusted resource subject to automatic endorsement, or is it still treated in a highly cautious 
fashion? We suspect that what is important here is not so much whether a subject trusts a particular 
resource so much as the extent to which they deem the information to be credible (or believable). 
The more credible a human agent perceives information to be, the more likely they are to accept it 
without question. A final issue that we have found somewhat problematic in relation to trust is the 
notion that information in the public domain needs to be subject to epistemic vetting and that this 
necessarily entails an increase in cognitive load (Sterelny, 2004). Inasmuch as the elevated cognitive 
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load  in  these  cases  is  attributable  to  the  need  to  make  trust  evaluations  and/or  quality  of 
information assessments, we have argued that technological solutions might be used to ameliorate 
the cognitive burden imposed on end-user agents (see Section 3.2). What is not clear, however, is 
whether the use of external resources necessarily entails an increase in cognitive load. Many cases 
of cognitive off-loading seem, to our mind, to capitalize on the ability of environmental resources to 
act as stand-ins or surrogates for internal processing. Similarly, some cases of extended cognition 
seem to involve less effort than their internal counterparts (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994). Inasmuch as 
cognitive load is equated with cognitive effort, it does not seem to us that all cases of cognitive or 
mental extension necessarily entail an increase in cognitive load. And, even if they do, the use of 
emerging technologies to provide explicit representations of trust and information quality would 
seem to constitute an effective method of minimizing this burden. Again, what we seem to confront 
is a situation where any shortfalls in the capacity of networks to fulfil the criteria for cognition 
extension  turn  out  to  be  the  targets  of  ongoing  research  and  technology  development  in  the 
disciplines of the network and information sciences.  
One concern that may be raised here is that we have erroneously conflated the notion of network-
based information retrieval with genuine cases of (biologically-based) mnemonic functioning. Even if 
all the criteria for cognitive extension were to be fulfilled (i.e. the availability, trust and accessibility 
criteria were fully satisfied), it would be simply false, the argument goes, to regard cases of network-
mediated information access as constituting genuine forms of extended memory. And the reason for 
this is that whereas the information we retrieve from bio-memory will always have been perceived 
or experienced at the same point in the past (during encoding, for example), the same is not true of 
much of the information content of a large-scale network environment like the WWW. Most of the 
information content in this sort of environment will not have been experienced first-hand by the 
end-user  agent.  And,  as  such,  it  does  not  appear  that  we  are  dealing  with  a  genuine  case  of 
extended memory in many cases where such networks are used to guide sequences of thought and 
action. This is, we think, an important criticism, but it only really applies to situations where we want 
to talk of networks as directly supporting mnemonic functions. While there are initiatives, like the 
Memories  for  Life
14  research programme  (O'Hara et al., 2006) , that do attempt to explore the 
contribution of network technologies to human memory, the  specific claim we are making about 
network resources  in the context of this paper   does not depend on whether such re sources 
constitute a form of extended memory or not. What we are  claiming is that NAIC can, under the 
right circumstances, constitute part of the repository of long -term knowledge and dispositional 
beliefs associated with a human agent. This claim is neutral with respect to the mechanism by which 
knowledge and beliefs are actually acquired. In some cases we might want to talk about an agent as 
acquiring beliefs by virtue of their direct interaction with the world (and their subsequent storage of 
these beliefs in an online information repository); in other cases, beliefs may be acquired without 
prior experience – they may be acquired, for example, by the efforts of others to enrich and refine 
online bodies of communal knowledge
15. 
In contrast to the case of mental states, we suggest that contemporary network systems, such as the 
WWW, are largely ill-suited to supporting environmentally-extended cases of cognitive processing. 
                                                           
14 http://www.memoriesforlife.org/ 
15 Some may see this as a rather radical claim, but the  claim that we can progressively enrich an agent’s body 
of domain-relevant knowledge without requiring that agent to experience the knowledge first-hand is largely 
compatible with much of the work in the knowledge engineering and intelligent agent communities. 18 
 
We suggest that in the case of such processing it is important that an agent should be able to 
interact  with  and  manipulate  external  resources  in  a  highly  flexible  and  largely  unconstrained 
fashion.  In  particular,  an  agent  should  be  able  to  adaptively  create  and  manipulate  external 
resources in such a way that the kind of problem confronting the biological brain is often profoundly 
different  from  that  confronting  the  larger  cognitive  system  (involving  the  brain,  body  and 
technological  environment)
16.  Initial  versions  of  the  WWW  were  dominated  by  largely  static 
resources  –  web  pages  containing  fixed  content  with  limited  opportunities  for  (reconstructive) 
interaction and manipulation. With the advent of Web 2.0 capabilities we are beginning to witness a 
gradual  move  to  more  participatory  modes  of  information  access,  ones  in  which  users  are 
encouraged to contribute novel information and enrich existing content using collaborative tagging 
and annotation schemes (see Steels, 2006). In all likelihood, this move towards greater interactivity 
on the web is likely to continue, and, as it does so, the opportunities for more cognitively-potent 
forms of web-based interaction are likely to increase. 
In the course of both propounding and evaluating the thesis of network-enabled cognition, our 
analysis has highlighted a number of areas for future research. Clearly, the factors contributing to 
subjective information reliability and credibility assessments are important focus areas for research, 
as  are  the  factors  associated  with  the  emergence,  maintenance  and  dissolution  of  trust 
relationships. Another area for research relates to the effects of network access on psycho-cognitive 
functioning.  Inasmuch  as  our  mental  states  and  processes  do,  at  times,  supervene  on  the 
informational and technological elements of a network system then we need to understand (and 
predict) exactly how our cognitive profile is altered by these basic bio-technological mergers. In 
particular we need to understand whether the mergers are always positive or even benign (see Carr, 
2008). The tendency is to view new technologies in a largely positive light (see Clark, 2003), but as 
Norman (1993) points out, human agents may come to rely on established technologies in largely 
unanticipated ways; the sudden replacement of these technologies with newer and seemingly more 
improved technologies can sometimes prove deleterious. Finally, in exploring the transformative 
potential of networks we should not ignore the potential effect of network-enabled capabilities on 
our core notions of who and what we are. If we do indeed stand on the brink of a technological era 
in which we have easy and reliable access to global knowledge, how will this affect our subjective 
impressions of our epistemic and cognitive competence? Will it one day make subjective, not just 
scientific,  sense  to  talk  about  our  own  personal  body  of  knowledge  and  beliefs  as  roughly  co-
extensive  with  the  contents  of  a  future  WWW?  And,  if  so,  what  effect  does  this  have  on  our 
traditional notions of cognitive agency and the self? There are many questions, but, as yet, few 
answers. Perhaps the real value of the thesis we have proposed is that it focuses attention on some 
of the problems and opportunities that confront the network sciences and, in particular, the nascent 
sciences of the Web (Berners-Lee et al., 2006a; Hendler et al., 2008). For the thesis of network-
enabled cognition is really a thesis about how the future evolution of our contemporary large-scale 
information networks may one day come to shape, influence and constrain the basic set of cognitive 
capabilities we associate with the biotechnologically hybrid mind.  
                                                           
16 This is one way in which external resources exert a transformative influence on human problem-solving: 
they enable the problem confronting the biological agent to be transformed, whilst preserving the general 
flavour of bio-computational processing. When we talk about the transformative potential of network systems 
we should bear in mind that it is not necessarily the basic set of agent-side bio-cognitive capabilities that is 
being transformed; it is cognitive potential of a system comprising the effective merger of both biological and 
technological resources. 19 
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